By Howard Jones

Dr. Howard Jones, University Research Professor of History at The University of Alabama, is the author of the recently published book "Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War."

Things are never as simple as they seem. In Vietnam, one presidential administration after another in Washington found out that intervention proved more tangled and unpredictable than it at first appeared. Odds are that the same would hold true in Iraq.

The Kennedy administration felt reasonably well informed about the state of South Vietnamese internal affairs when it opted to topple President Ngo Dinh Diem. Numerous firsthand reports from the CIA and a succession of special investigatory missions attested to his inept rule and to his vulnerability in the face of a growing opposition from the generals of the South Vietnamese army. According to most accounts, these military figures, in alliance with a new civilian leader in the form of Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, offered a viable alternative to Diem. The White House therefore sent signals to the generals that they could count on its support. The generals were experienced and well equipped. The vice president would take over in Saigon in line with constitutional requirements. What could go wrong?

Furthermore, the coup provided another great benefit. Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised President Kennedy to support the coup as the chief means for improving the war effort against the Vietcong and thereby facilitating a phased U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam. Indeed, the president had instructed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the spring of 1962 to draft a withdrawal program that stipulated a dramatic military reduction by the end of 1965. The resulting “Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam” rested on the assumption that by the end of the three-year period, U.S. advisory and training efforts would have improved South Vietnam’s capacity to control the insurgency. In a process later known as “Vietnamization,” the United States could then remove all special military forces from Vietnam and return the assistance effort to its low-key advisory level of January 1961. Kennedy had long regarded the war as South Vietnam’s alone to win or lose, and he had staunchly resisted the relentless pressure from both military and civilian advisers to send American combat troops. Conflicting reports regarding “progress” in the war had left a phased military withdrawal as the most feasible option.

The Buddhist crisis of the spring and summer of 1963 had forced a postponement of the withdrawal effort, but the movement regained intensity in the fall when the Diem regime failed to resolve the fast spreading domestic violence. The White House expected a relatively bloodless coup, feeling certain that Diem would leave the country in exile. Instead, as is so often the nature of coups, events got out of hand. The assault on the palace rapidly catapulted into a dual assassination that led to the deaths of both Diem and his hated brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The coup leader, General Duong Van Minh, had ordered the assassinations without consulting his colleagues.

Bitter dissension instantly spread among the coup makers, most of whom had joined the conspiracy with the understanding that no harm would come to Diem. The image of competence and solidarity that had first surrounded the generals in their successful coup quickly dissipated, replaced by visceral divisions at the top that spread into all levels of the fledgling government and led to more domestic turmoil. Not surprisingly, the Vietcong escalated its offensive in the midst of this chaos, drawing the United States even more deeply into what became its longest and most disastrous war.

President Kennedy’s central tragedy lies in his promoting a coup aimed at facilitating a military withdrawal from Vietnam, for his actions tied the United States more closely to Vietnam and thereby disrupted his plan to bring the troops home. Moreover, the administration’s involvement in the coup made it an accomplice in the assassinations.

Three weeks after the coup, President Kennedy likewise fell victim to assassination, effectively ending the prospect of a military withdrawal. The new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, sought a quick solution to the problems in Vietnam and raised the level of covert actions against Hanoi in a proposal code-named OPLAN 34A. The outcome was the Gulf of Tonkin crisis of August 1964, followed by an Americanized war that led to the death of a generation.

The Kennedy administration had not been able to control events. Nor had it proved itself capable of preparing for all contingencies. The president’s advisers had erroneously assumed that superior U.S. military and economic resources would override all problems inherent in intervention. Instead of saving South Vietnam, the United States increasingly alienated its allies and received blame for almost everything that went wrong in the aftermath.

The Bush administration would be well advised to examine U.S. interventionist efforts in Vietnam and other places in the world. Things are never as simple as they seem.